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Post-Cold War geopolitics has been characterised by unipolar military 
power (America) and global economic 
tripolarity (North America, the Euro-
pean Union and East Asia). Competition 
over access to fossil fuels, meanwhile, 
has intensified owing to increased scar-
city, geographic concentration, domestic 
demand and import dependence, forcing 
energy – and, indeed, foreign – policy to 
emphasise strategies that secure ener-
gy supplies. Thus today’s major power 
politics revolve around access to natural 
resources.
Thanks to the war in Iraq, American mili-
tary borders and geopolitical power now 
extend from southern Europe to the Middle 
East to a particularly resource-rich region 
that American strategy aims to cut off from 
Russia, Europe and China: the Caspian 
Region. A long-term American military 
presence could open it to American busi-
ness and non-governmental organisations, 
which might empower America to shape 
the region’s societies and control access 
to its oil and gas. This would give the lone 
superpower indirect control over the eco-
nomic and technological development of 
regional contenders such as China, India 
and Russia. Whether or not it succeeds, 
the American effort is already inducing 
responses from both near and far.
The object of the game
The Caspian Region (Azerbaijan, Kaza-
khstan, Turkmenistan, Iran and Russia) 
is home to 45% of the world’s known gas 
reserves and 10% of its oil reserves. This 
vast yet concentrated wealth has trans-
formed the Caspian Region and the whole 
of Central Eurasia into an intersection of 
interstate rivalry, enterprise competition, 
and intervention by regional state and non-
state actors. 
Aside from Russia and Iran, the region is 
not in the territorial sphere of the secu-
rity institutions of any one of the major 
powers, hence there is no ‘agreed upon’, 
and thus ‘stable’, zone of influence. Extra-
regional state and non-state actors com-
pete to exercise power and influence over 
the polities and societies of their hosts by 
searching for allies among local actors. 
Given this complex matrix of social forces, 
competition and cooperation are ad hoc, 
complex and even ambiguous. Uncertainty 
and unpredictability are the rules of the 
game. As all major powers are involved 
and regime legitimacy is at stake, competi-
tion here has the potential to destabilise 
the entire world system.
For example, China in particular must tap 
these resources to secure an adequate 
energy supply, which brings it into compe-
tition, if not confrontation, with America. 
In recent decades, the Chinese economy 
has been growing at a rate substantially 
above that of the world and is becoming 
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more dependent on imports, especially 
fossil fuels. America’s oil production, 
meanwhile, peaked way back in 1970-71; 
if its oil imports are interrupted, it has no 
spare capacity for its European and East 
Asian allies. Both powers want into a fossil 
fuel-rich region that is essentially Russia’s 
backyard.
Pipeline politics
America’s main obstacle to expanding 
its role in the Caspian Region is Russian 
influence, particularly over the main trans-
port routes of oil and gas to the European 
Union. In the late 1990s, the Americans 
became involved in determining the loca-
tion of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil 
pipeline. Backed by the Clinton Admin-
istration and constructed in 2002 by an 
international consortium in which British 
and American oil companies played the 
leading role, the BTC is an important part 
of the East-West energy corridor. It circum-
vents Iran and Russia in order to minimise 
both countries’ influence, and is the first 
major oil export route connecting Cas-
pian oil to European consumers. Oil from 
Azerbaijan began flowing through the BTC 
in May 2005 to the Turkish Mediterranean 
port of Ceyhan, located near the massive 
American military base at Incirlik.
As though in response, Russia concluded 
deals for gas pipelines into its territory 
at the May 2007 Ashgabat gas pipeline 
summit. These included the construction 
of the Caspian Littoral Gas Pipeline from 
eastern Turkmenistan and a parallel pipe-
line from Kazakhstan, and the rehabilita-
tion and perhaps expansion of the Central 
Asia Centre Pipeline from Turkmenistan 
and Uzbekistan. These pipeline agree-
ments have reinforced Russia’s regional 
political influence by increasing its control 
over energy exports and forestalling rival 
routes to the West.
China, too, is contending for influence on 
pipeline location and construction, moti-
vated by its overdependence on Middle 
Eastern oil and its own perception that it 
lacks control over market and strategic 
factors in times of emergency. China cur-
rently imports 60 percent of its oil from 
the Middle East, and the region’s political 
instability coupled with the possibility of 
military confrontation with America over 
Taiwan makes China nervous, as it lacks 
the military capability to protect oil ship-
ments over its long-distance marine route, 
especially at the chokepoints of the Hor-
muz and Malacca Straits. In other words, 
China fears an American blockade of its 
Middle Eastern oil imports in the event of 
irreconcilable conflict. Diversifying sup-
plies by seeking overland oil transporta-
tion routes from Central Eurasia and the 
Caspian Region is an attractive alternative. 
Thus in late 2006, China and Kazakhstan 
agreed to build the second section of the 
Atasu-Alashankou oil pipeline, and gas-
rich Turkmenistan agreed to a gas pipeline 
to China through Kazakh territory.
Rising China
China’s recent engagements with Central 
Eurasian and Caspian countries, namely 
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, 
have unsettled the Americans. The region’s 
political turbulence, and the geopolitical 
energy rivalry instigated by the Americans, 
have propelled Russia and China to build 
regional strategic partnerships, the most 
important of which is the Shanghai Coop-
eration Organisation (SCO). Led by China 
and Russia, its members include Kaza-
khstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, 
Kyrgyzstan and four observer states, Mon-
golia, Iran, Pakistan and India. Under the 
SCO framework, bilateral and multilateral 
energy cooperation will play a significant 
role in counteracting American ambitions. 
Meanwhile, America’s plans to deploy a 
missile defence system in East European 
countries and Japan may spur closer 
military cooperation between Russia and 
China within the SCO.
A politically stable and economically devel-
oping Central Eurasia and Caspian Region 
is in China’s interest, as it shares a 3,000 
km border with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
and Tajikistan and a 4,300 km border with 
Russia. China once had disputed borders 
with all four countries, which could have 
fuelled a separatist movement in China’s 
Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region and 
damaged China’s national security inter-
ests. By signing the Agreement on Deep-
ening Military Trust in Border Regions in 
1996, the first multilateral security agree-
ment between them, and bilateral and 
multilateral border agreements later that 
decade, the disputes have been resolved. 
Moreover, since establishing diplomatic 
ties in the 1990s, China’s trade relation-
ship with the region’s countries has been 
growing sharply. From 1992 to 2005, total 
bilateral trade between China and the five 
Central Asian countries has increased 190 
percent from a mere $459 million to $8.73 
billion. 
Meanwhile, multilateral energy coopera-
tion has been active since the 2006 SCO 
summit meeting in Shanghai, where Rus-
sian President Vladimir Putin spurred the 
creation of an energy club to expand trans-
portation and communication coopera-
tion. Whether bilaterally or multilaterally, 
China’s energy involvement in Central Eur-
asia and the Caspian Region is deepening, 
and this deeply concerns Washington.
An oil-lovers’ triangle: Russia 
and the future of Sino-American 
relations
China’s strategic demand for supply secu-
rity and its active energy engagement 
policy alarm Washington. Four factors will 
fundamentally determine the nature of 
Sino-American relationship with respect to 
Central Eurasia and the Caspian Region.
(1) China’s role in SCO over the next ten 
years. China owes its deepening rela-
tions in the region to the increased 
military, political and economic 
cooperation among SCO members. 
Whether SCO exists as regional bal-
last or global balancer, China will be 
a great power to be reckoned with in 
the region, but the uncertainty of SCO 
cohesion in the face of American chal-
lenges could undermine China’s geo-
political influence.
(2) China’s energy cooperation with Cen-
tral Eurasian and Caspian states. 
If China’s bilateral and multilateral 
energy cooperation moves forward too 
rapidly, an already wary America might 
respond more aggressively.
(3) How Russia defends its backyard 
against penetration by other great 
powers, particularly America and 
China. Russia’s current defence policy 
in the region, like the Soviet Union’s 
during the Cold War, uses China as a 
balancing power to counter the strate-
gic offensive of America’s war on ter-
ror. The uncertainty of such triangular 
relations not only affects the long-term 
strategic partnership between China 
and Russia, but also future geopolitics 
between China and America.
(4) The American regional military pres-
ence and its ongoing geopolitical con-
sequences. While unilateral American 
military penetration has resulted in tur-
bulence and instability, China bilateral-
ly and multilaterally seeks to promote 
multi-polarisation and to balance pow-
ers by working with SCO countries. So 
far, American power projection has 
induced geopolitical backlashes from 
Russia, China and the region, such as 
calling for the withdrawal of American 
troops and closer military cooperation 
within SCO. 
A new Cold War?
Oil and gas are sources of energy, and thus 
sources of wealth and power, including the 
capacity to project military power into the 
world’s energy-rich areas. Existing resourc-
es are decreasing rapidly while newly 
discovered ones disappoint. Major oil 
consumers will have to implement more 
active policies in order to satisfy their oil 
needs and intervene militarily to safeguard 
oil production. Export will become more 
intense. This will have enormous implica-
tions for global peace and security. 
In this new ‘Great Game’, each of the main 
powers – America, Russia and China – is 
backing a different pipeline project and 
seeking to draw the region’s governments 
into its respective orbit. Many fear a new 
Cold War, as it is not yet clear whether 
the main powers will see each other as 
rivals, allies or as combinations of the two. 
America could use political, economic 
and perhaps military pressure to expand 
its influence and remove any obstacles 
to the safe flow of oil. Unable to compete 
with the Americans militarily, China will try 
to avoid confronting Washington head-
on and ally with local powers to defend 
its regional interests. Russia, meanwhile, 
might continue to work with China politi-
cally and militarily to defend its backyard 
from American geopolitical challenges. 
Each main power’s nightmare is finding 
itself alone against an alliance of the other 
two. The world’s nightmare is direct con-
frontation among any of them. 
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